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N o t e s
1 . According to the latest data produced by
t h e international community, Kosova's rural
population is the poorest in Europe, after Moldova
and Tajikistan. Unemployment throughout the
country is around 80 per cent, and upwards of
2 0 per cent of the population lives in abject
poverty. See ICG, 'A Kosovo Road Map: Final
Status' (www.crisisweb.org).
2 . Consult the Official Saudi information website for
news on activities of various Saudi 'charities' in
Kosova (www.saudinf.com).
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The Ba l ka ns
I S A  B L U MI
'Albanians have been Muslims for more than 500
years and they do not need outsiders [Arabs] to tell
them what is the proper way to practise Islam.' Mufti
of Kosova, Rexhep Boja's recent retort to the efforts
of Arab NGOs to impose their Salafi practices on
Kosovar Albanians reflects a largely unappreciated
phenomenon in the post-communist Balkans. The
following exposes the questionable manner in which
Western powers have compartmentalized their pri-
orities in the region and how Saudi-based humani-
tarian agencies have filled in the vacuum. At issue is
how Western policies of 'conflict resolution' have left
'ethno-religious' communities at the mercy of inter-
national, 'faith-based' organizations that, in turn, ex-
ploit the poverty and fragmented social conditions
of Ð in our case here Ð Albanians. 
I n d o c t r i n a t i n g
A l b a n i a n s
Dynamics of Islamic Aid
As a result of policies that have basically de-
ferred addressing rural Kosova's social and
economic needs to organizations whose
basic modus operandi is the religious indoc-
trination of the population, much of Koso-
va's rural society is being isolated from their
fellow countrymen and the world at large. A
result of such isolation is the increasing vul-
nerability of Kosova's Muslims to hostility
emanating from those very Western gov-
ernments that neglected to address their
initial needs. It is therefore ironic that as
self-proclaimed Western societies cower be-
fore the 'the rise of Islamic fundamentalism',
their discriminatory policies towards Koso-
va's rural 'Muslim' population may prove to
be directly responsible for the production of
Europe's own 'Taliban', which in the future
may indeed prove hostile to 'Western values
and interests'. 
Future t a l i bs ?
The central problem is not doctrinal but
socio-economic. After decades of discrimi-
nation and two years of war resulting in the
murder of much of the adult male popula-
tion in rural areas, Kosova's peasants are liv-
ing in abject poverty.1 Many rural communi-
ties in Kosova have, as a result, become
more or less dependent on outside NGOs.
The most active in rural Kosova has been the
Saudi Joint Committee for the Relief of
Kosova and Chechnya (SJCRKC), which has
provided for the basic daily needs of over a
hundred communities. While food, housing,
and clothing are provided by the SJCRKC, its
primary task has been education. The forced
segregation of the sexes in schools, the
focus on young male education based on
the memorization of the Qur'an, and little if
any emphasis on what many would deem
essential survival skills have attracted the
suspicion of Kosova's indigenous Muslim
and secular leaders. 
As a consequence, open hostility towards
Saudi efforts to control the content of the
spiritual lives of Albanians, the destruction
of many historical sites deemed to encour-
age 'idolatry', and other confrontations be-
tween indigenous forms of religious prac-
tice and what many see as 'Arab cultural im-
perialism' have become manifest. While
small numbers of Albanians from the former
Yugoslavia did go to study Islamic theology
in the Arabic-speaking world (many trav-
elled to study under the now deceased Al-
banian-born scholar, Nasir al Din al-Albani),
the vast majority of Albanians had no previ-
ous cultural contact with the larger Islamic
world. The recent influences from the out-
side, with their substantial aid packages,
have clearly changed this. The nature of this
change is creating an environment that pits
local organizations trying to maintain local
Islamic traditions, as personified by Rexhep
Boja and the Albanian grand mufti, Hafiz
Koi, against those influenced by imported
p r a c t i c e s .
Despite their efforts, with little or no fi-
nancial resources of their own and the ne-
glect of interest among the members of
Kosova's internationally imposed adminis-
trators, Kosova's leaders are incapable of
providing an alternative to the Salafi educa-
tional practices that are being propagated
in many parts of rural Kosova. The SJCRKC
reported in late 2001 to have invested four
million Saudi riyals in Kosova. Nearly half of
that (about USD 500,000) had been spent to
sponsor 388 religious 'propagators' (i.e. mis-
sionaries) in the immediate post-war period.
What these propagators Ð whom I would
call experts in post-conflict assessment Ð
did was identify the communities most suit-
able to their agenda. While there are no offi-
cial numbers published, at least 98 mosque
complexes with and without accompanying
schools have been built in rural Kosova as a
result of their work.2 One can draw compar-
isons to Afghan communities in the 1980s
when large numbers of orphaned and sin-
gle-mother families were also dependent
on Saudi 'charity' in the border refugee
camps of Pakistan. As with Afghans, rural
Kosovars, dependant on the 'generosity' of
others, have become vulnerable to 'foreign'
doctrines and practices.
In many ways local resistance to SJCRKC
has taken on the tone of general hostility to-
wards Arabs that is being beamed across
the 24-hour news programmes watched
with great interest in Kosova. There is a
growing sense among Kosova's urban pop-
ulation, for instance, that by being associat-
ed to the same faith as Usama bin Laden
(there is no differentiation made between
Salafi practitioners in Kosova Ð locals call
them m u h a j a d d i n Ð today and Bin Laden),
that Kosovars' long-term desires for inde-
pendence are being in some way jeopar-
dized. As a result, new political lines are
being drawn in Kosovar society, reflecting
more than ever the rural/urban divide that
has historically divided the Kosova popula-
tion (Blumi 2001). In reaction, many among
those who have become reliant on SJCRKC
assistance feel persecuted, a condition that
is politicized by some. Political Islam as it
has emerged in other parts of the world,
therefore, while still at its infancy in Kosova
is transforming to fit local dynamics. One
can follow in the Islamic Community of
Kosova's (Bashkesia Islame e Kosovs (BIK))
journal T a k v i m i, the occasional debate over
the merits of an Islamic party in dealing with
the political and social issues plaguing
Kosova today. Indeed, advocates for the cre-
ation of an Islamic party in general reveal a
growing sense of political power in rural
Kosovar society, one that is becoming more
interventionist when it comes to influenc-
ing cultural mores and articulating a distinc-
tive voice for rural Kosova. 
A l b a n i a
Interestingly, Albanians are not destined
to take the 'Taliban' route. Indeed, Muslims
in Albania have successfully thwarted the
penetration of Wahhabi extremism in their
communities. Unlike rural Kosova, parents
in Albania always had a number of options
for educating their children. This proves key.
In Albania, not only are there dozens of
schools that have been erected since 1990
by foreign Christian organizations that try
to woo the population away from their 50
years of communist indoctrination, but a
Turkish faith-based organization inspired by
the liberal Fetullah G  l e n has also opened a
number of well-attended d e r s h a n es in Alba-
nia (Agai 2002; Balci 2002). Armed with doc-
trinal and sectarian alternatives, local Mus-
lims in the Albanian-speaking regions of the
Balkans prove, when given a choice, effec-
tive in staving off the indoctrinating efforts
of outside interests. In Albania, as noted in
interviews with the grand mufti of Albania
and others, Arab Salafi organizations, while
targeting Albania as a potential area of in-
fluence in the early 1990s, have all but aban-
doned the country, choosing to focus their
resources on Kosova's rural population. Why
this happened is significant in that Albani-
ans in Albania clearly made a choice to not
go down the Wahhabi route. Salafi organi-
zations, eager to proselytize as other evan-
gelical groups coming from the United
States or their Greek Orthodox rivals south
of the border, learned that Albanian Mus-
lims, when armed with a choice between
their brand of intolerant and rigid spirituali-
ty and others, preferred the milder track.
This lesson could again be taught in Kosova
if communities were given similar resources.
Among Albanian-speaking Muslims, the
issues discussed here are particularly impor-
tant as their self-perceived place in the
world is now dominated by anti-Muslim
sentiments. The sense of being unwelcome
by Europe, of being persecuted and indeed
blamed for events taking place in other
parts of the globe by Americans is a com-
mon theme among self-identified Muslims
today. This sense of exclusion is being used
in some quarters to shift community loyal-
ties away from Europe and the United
States. Such a sense of increasing isolation,
as European, US, and non-denominational
organizations continue to ignore the spiri-
tual, educational, and cultural needs of local
populations, breeds the right kind of resent-
ment needed to produce a new generation
of supporters of anti-Western causes. With
more than 98 primary and secondary
schools built throughout rural Kosova, the
creation of a new generation of Albanian
Muslims is underway. As the outside world
has given free reign to Saudi-based organi-
zations to set up orphanages, mosques, and
schools, the results in the isolated regions of
Kosova are already evident. 
While many continue to resist the sectari-
an implications of these activities, others
concede that the arrival of these proselytiz-
ing organizations are creating internal con-
flicts as people are drawn by promises of
money, jobs, education, and indeed a new
identity. Unless immediate attention is paid
to providing an alternative for rural commu-
nities in Kosova, the spectacle of outside
powers manipulating internal sectarian dif-
ferences, as in Lebanon in the 1970s and
1980s, is a distinct possibility. It would be
yet another tragic demonstration of West-
ern short-sightedness that its failure to pro-
vide a few million dollars to rebuild the lives
of hundreds of thousands of human beings
would result in decades of conflict and in-
stability. The economic stinginess and the
cultural chauvinism that produces this ne-
glect may come back to haunt Europe, end-
ing any illusion that things have been made
right in the Balkans over the last three years.Albanian refugees
from Kosovo at
a United Arab
Emirates refugee
camp in Kukes,
A l b a n i a .
